

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T GENEVA 5396

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS, POST-PLenary CONVERSATION, JUNE 29, 1977  
(SALT TWO-1261)

1. (ROWNY/TRUSOV - BELETSKY, A-1616)

A. NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER

IN RESPONDING TO TRUSOV'S REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER, ROWNY REASSURED TRUSOV OF HIS CONVICTION THAT US AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT ANY TREATY ENTERED INTO WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED. FURTHER, ROWNY WAS CONFIDENT A PROVISION ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD PER FORCE BE A PART OF THAT TREATY. TRUSOV REPLIED THAT IF WE WERE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WE SHOULD FIND IT EASY TO AGREE ON LANGUAGE TO REFLECT THAT AGREEMENT.

B. TELEMETRY

TRUSOV STATED THAT TRANSMITTING TELEMETRIC INFORMATION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT. ROWNY REPLIED THAT IF SOVIETS BELIEVE TELEMETRY HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT  
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THEY SHOULD DROP THEIR PROPOSAL FOR EXEMPTING IT FROM THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE ANY MEASURE OR PRACTICE WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDES VERIFICATION. TRUSOV SAID THE SOVIET SIDE OBJECTS TO EQUATING TRANSMISSION OF TELEMETRY WITH DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES. ROWNY REPLIED US HAD NEVER EQUATED THE TWO AND WAS NOT CLAIMING THAT THE TRANSMISSION OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION WAS NECESSARILY DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT. TRUSOV SAID THAT US PREOCCUPATION WITH THIS

ISSUE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT US WAS TRYING TO HOBBLE SOVIET METHODS OF TRANSMITTING TELEMETRY IN THE FUTURE. WHEN TRUSOV PRESSED ROWNY TO GIVE EXAMPLES OF HOW TELEMETRY METHODS COULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION, ROWNY SAID THAT CITING EXAMPLES WAS NOT TO THE POINT. RATHER, THE POINT WAS A SIMPLE ONE: THERE SHOULD BE NO DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT.

#### C. NUMERICAL VALUES ON THROW-WEIGHT

ROWNY RAISED THE DESIRABILITY OF AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING NUMERICAL VALUES FOR THROW-WEIGHT AND LAUNCH-WEIGHT FOR LIGHT AND HEAVY ICBMS. TRUSOV DISMISSED THE SUBJECT, SAYING THAT "ADEQUATE PROVISIONS" FOR THROW-WEIGHT AND LAUNCH-WEIGHT ARE AGREED UPON IN THE JDT AND THEREFORE NUMERICAL VALUES ARE "NOT NECESSARY."

#### 2. (STOERTZ - BEECROFT/PAVLICHENKO, A-1618)

##### A. OVERCOUNTING

PAVLICHENKO EXPRESSED EXASPERATION AT WHAT HE SAW AS CONTINUOUS AMERICAN EMPHASIS ON "ARTIFICIAL" PROBLEMS OF DISTINGUISHABILITY AND VERIFIABILITY. HE ASSERTED THAT THE US "WANTED" TO ADD SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. WHEN D&P, THE SS-X-16/SS-20 QUESTION AND "MORE THAN TENS OF OTHER SYSTEMS (I.E., BOMBER VARIANTS) WERE CONSIDERED, WE WERE  
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TRYING TO OVER COUNT SOVIET SYSTEMS BY "SOME HUNDREDS" OF WEAPONS. STOERTZ EMPHASIZED THAT THE US DID NOT "WANT" TO OVERCOUNT. HE NOTED THAT ALL THE CASES THE US WAS RAISING REFLECTED REAL PROBLEMS OF DISTINGUISHABILITY AND CONVERTIBILITY. IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT, AS PAVLICHENKO HAD SUGGESTED, FOR THE US SIMPLY TO TAKE SOVIET ASSURANCES ON FAITH. PAVLICHENKO SAID THE SOVIET SIDE SAW NO NEED FOR ANY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS OR PROVISION OF DATA; IT HAD PROVIDED INFORMATION ON NUMBERS OF SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS AND MIRV LAUNCHERS AT D&P WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT FURTHER PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED IT. "BUT THERE HAS TO BE SOME LIMIT." HE SAID HE BELIEVED THE US KNEW THE WEIGHT OF THE SS-19 AND WAS NOT HANDICAPPED IN ITS MISSILE DECISIONS BY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE.

##### B. DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT

PAVLICHENKO DEFENDED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT NO CHANGE BE REQUIRED IN CURRENT TESTING PRACTICES UNDER XVI.3 BY SAYING THAT SOVIET TESTING PRACTICES MAY HAVE CAUSED PROBLEMS "BEFORE NOVEMBER 1974", BUT THAT CURRENT PRACTICES SHOULD RAISE NO CONCERNS ABOUT VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK LIMITATIONS. IT WOULD BE "POLITICALLY INTOLERABLE" FOR EITHER SIDE TO INTRODUCE NEW PRACTICES BEFORE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. AS FOR TELEMETRY, THE

SOVIET SIDE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT ITS RELEVANCE WAS TO  
VERIFICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT; PERHAPS IT  
COULD BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH "QUALITATIVE MEASURES" IN  
SALT THREE. STOERTZ OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL SUCH QUALITATIVE  
CONSTRAINTS HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED TO BY THE SIDES IN SALT TWO,  
CITING AS EXAMPLES THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MIRVS AND  
MRVS AND THE LIMITATIONS ON THROW-WEIGHT AND LAUNCH-WEIGHT  
OF ICBMS.EARLE

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## Message Attributes

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